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Abstract
This research sought to explore the implications of Non-
Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to trade on the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area 
(FTA). If the COMESA free trade area is appropriately 
dealt with, COMESA members and trade stakeholders 
will get information that is important in their attempt to 
attain the goal of eliminating trade impediments within the 
region. This will promote regional economic integration 
and enhance growth through increased investment levels; 
scaled up exchange of goods and services; and enhanced 
socio-economic cooperation. Such cooperation will 
directly contribute to the improved political and trade 
relations. The research adopted a case study design in 
which various cases were examined to understand issues 
surrounding the implications of NTBs on COMESA free 
trade area. A qualitative research methodology was also 
utilised while data was collected through key informant 
interviews and document analysis. The research concluded 
that NTBs in COMESA FTA are used on health issues as 
well as to protect the infant industries in the region. The 
research therefore recommended that COMESA members 
find a working definition of what constitute an infant 
industry for the purpose of applying for derogation; and 
also that they make use of bilateral trade agreements to 
eliminate existing NTBs where States clearly indicated 
their objectives of removing all NTBs that inhibit trade 
between them. 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) have become defining features of the modern 
economy and a powerful force for globalisation. In 2005, 
more than 250 RTAs had been notified to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Brown, 2005). One such African 
regional integration agreement was COMESA which was 
initially established in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Area 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). It was established 
within the framework of the Organisation of African 
Unity’s (OAU) Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of 
Lagos (ACTRAV, 2012). According to ACTRAV (2012), 
the PTA was transformed into COMESA in 1994. The 
PTA was established to take advantage of a larger market 
size, to share the region’s common heritage and destiny 
and to allow for greater social and economic co-operation 
(ACTRAV, 2012). COMESA comprises of 19 African 
member states which are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. These countries have agreed to co-operate 
in developing their natural and human resources for the 
good of all their people (ACTRAV, 2012). COMESA 
adopts the market integration approach. It is one of the 
most important regional trade groupings in Africa besides 
the South African Development Community (SADC) and 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
For a number of countries that have limited opportunities 
for increasing their exports to Europe, the Americas and 
Asia, COMESA looms large as the way of the future. 
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COMESA is the first African economic community to 
have in place an FTA, which was established in October 
2000. This was the third in the world after the European 
Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. It 
is the only regional grouping to have signed a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United 
States in October 2001, within the framework of the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Karingi, 2015). 
One of the objectives of COMESA is to have a full FTA 
guaranteeing the free movement of goods and services 
produced within COMESA and the removal of all tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers.
It has become common-place to recognise that the use 
of tariffs to restrict international trade has been gradually 
replaced in recent years by the use of other tools of 
commercial policy. According to Deardorff (1987), these 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) include such heterogeneous 
policy tools as import quotas, Voluntary Export Restraints 
(VERs), exchange controls, domestic content requirements 
among other issues. 
Katenga (2011) asserts that NTBs have been widely 
cited as a significant constraint to intra-COMESA trade. 
Gathii (2011) notes that, only limited steps have been 
made across Africa to implement the commitments in 
the regional economic communities for the elimination 
NTBs. A number of goods and sectors are excluded from 
the agreement. As a result, there is little evidence of 
progress on further deepening of trade liberalisation and 
facilitation. To this end, there is a need for serious focus 
on the best ways to address these NTBs otherwise the 
cost of doing business across borders in COMESA will 
be unnecessarily high and scaring away the much needed 
investment in the region. Again these NTBs will militate 
against the formation of tripartite free trade area if not 
immediately addressed.
Nevertheless, trade in the COMESA is hampered by 
procedural obstacles imposed by individual countries. 
Although there is some progress in implementation, there 
are indications that, in spite of the commitments made 
by the partner states to remove NTBs, they remain a 
serious obstacle to trade within the region. NTBs continue 
to increase the cost of doing business in the region and 
have negatively impacted on trade and cooperation.  A 
World Bank (2011) study finds that notified NTBs affect 
products accounting for 20% of regional trade.
It is therefore against this background that this study 
seeks to assess the implication of non-tariff barriers on 
COMESA free trade area with particular focus on Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.
1 .   L I T E R A R T U R E  R E V I E W  A N D 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The main thrust of this section is to provide the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study as well as review pertinent 
literature on the existence of NTBs hindering trade within 
COMESA region and also assess costs attached to their 
prevalence. The discussion will pay special attention to 
the fact that whereas some of NTBs are purely illegal 
under the WTO and COMESA Treaty, exceptional 
cases exists where other measures are considered to be 
legitimate. For instance measures aimed at protecting 
human, animal or plant life or health in the form of 
sanitary and phytosanitary are permissible as long as they 
do not unnecessarily inhibit trade. The study employed 
the concept of NTBs within COMESA which is grounded 
in the theory of complex interdependency an idea put 
forth by Keohane and Nye in 1977 to explain complex 
transnational connections and interdependencies between 
states and societies. 
Keohane and Nye (1977) define interdependence as 
a situation in which actors or events in different parts of 
the system affect each other in a manner where there is 
potential for benefits and potential for tragedy as well. 
The theory recognises that the various and complex 
transnational connections and interdependencies between 
states and societies were increasing, while the use of 
military force and power balancing are decreasing 
but remain important. Keohane and Nye (1997) also 
importantly differentiated between interdependence and 
dependence in analysing the role of power in politics 
and the relations between international actors. Le Roy 
(2012) contends that other than the state, there are other 
multiple actors inclusive but not restricted to inter-state, 
trans-governmental and transnational structures that are 
increasingly shaping the international system. In the post-
cold war period, non-state structures such as the United 
Nations, African Union, SADC International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, multinational companies, churches, 
pressure groups and Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) have become active players in the international 
system. Interdependency emphasises that all different 
actors are interconnected through a variety of channels 
such as trade, finance, travel and communications. 
Interdependency is also based on the assumption that all 
these actors are benefiting from closer ties that the world 
would be peaceful and prosperous. However, it does not 
mean that relationships are asymmetrical because some 
international actors may be more vulnerable than others. 
These vulnerable actors will resort to the use of NTBs in 
trade relations. 
Keohane and Nye (1977) clarify their understanding 
of interdependence and its implications for international 
relations. They indicated that interdependence generates 
classic problems of political strategy, since it implies that 
the actions of the states, and significant non-state actors 
will impose costs on other members of the system. These 
affected actors will respond politically if they are able, 
in an attempt to avoid having the burdens of adjustment 
forced on them. From the foreign policy standpoint, 
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the problem facing individual governments is how to 
benefit from international exchange while maintaining 
as much autonomy as possible. From the perspective of 
the international system, the problem is how to generate 
and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977). This theory is applicable to 
the study in that COMESA member states depend on 
each other for trade. However, there exist barriers to this 
interdependence in the name of regulatory frameworks 
imposed by member States. This has complicated the 
interdependence. An analysis of trade between Zambia 
and Zimbabwe can be said to be that of interdependency. 
Le Roy (2012) noted that the opening up of markets that is 
associated with liberalism has seen national interests being 
redefined to accommodate interests that might be outside 
a country’s borders. In such arrangements, Brenner (2000) 
noted that it is imperative that States act in a manner that 
ensures protection of their interests in other countries.
As regional integration initiatives begin to address 
NTBs, they are faced with the practical challenge as 
well as the working definition of NTBs. As a result it is 
inevitable for deep divisions to emerge among scholars 
in their effort to define what NTBs are and on the proper 
mechanism to address them. 
It is crucial to state that despite substantial literature on 
NTBs, a great deal of literature has focused on individual 
types of NTBs and only in exceptional instances is 
sophisticated empirical analyses of their economic and 
social implications provided. Even though Article 49 
of the COMESA Treaty provides for the elimination of 
all existing NTBs and refraining from introducing new 
ones in order to enhance a transparent and predictable 
regional trading environment conducive for trade growth, 
in practice it does appear that NTBs measures are 
widespread, increasing and are a real obstacle to intra-
regional trade expansion. 
Negasi (2009) argued that some COMESA members 
continue to introduce NTBs such as periodic ban on 
imports, imposition of additional import levies and 
other forms of import controls, police roadblocks, 
corrupt practices at roadblocks, and road toll charges as 
protectionist devices. This undermines the credibility of 
the Trade Protocol and makes it irrelevant in the eyes of 
traders, investors and consumers at large (Negasi, 2009).
Major impediments to trade in the region are related to 
procedural obstacles in the application of NTBs leading 
to administrative and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Another 
category of barriers relates to NTBs in the form of import 
measures, mainly SPS and TBT. When these standards 
and requirements are imposed unilaterally to protect local 
industry they can have a severe restrictive impact on 
trade. With Zimbabwe having adopted an open economy 
approach and with trade accounting for almost 75% 
of GDP, the imposition of a ban on its most important 
trading partner is cause for alarm and raises some serious 
questions (World Bank, 2016). Protectionist arguments 
appear somewhat misplaced in light of the current 
narrative about regional integration and its many benefits. 
1.1  Categories of NTBs IN COMESA FTA
According to Article 4 of the COMESA Regulations on 
NTBs (2014), NTBs are generally categorised as follows: 
Government participation in trade and restrictive 
practices tolerated by Government;
Customs and administrative entry procedures; 
Technical barriers to trade; 
Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; 
Specific limitations; 
Charges on imports; and
Other (Procedural Problems), (COMESA Regulations 
on NTBs, 2014).
1.2  Types of NTBs in COMESA FTA
1.2.1  Quantitative Restrictions 
Licensing of foreign trade is closely related to quantitative 
restrictions quotas on imports and exports of certain 
goods. A quantitative restriction refers to a ban on imports 
or exports after a determined quantity (the quota) has 
entered the territory of another member State and there 
are different types of quantitative restrictions (Van den 
Bosche, 2005). Quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports is a direct administrative form of government 
regulation of foreign trade. Pursuant to Article XI: 1 of 
GATT WTO members including COMESA who are all 
WTO contracting parties, are generally prohibited from 
maintaining quantitative restrictions. Consequently, 
quantitative restrictions, whether quotas, import or export 
charges or other measures, are a violation of the rule in 
Article XI: 1. Evidence however, shows that in spite 
of the prohibitions under WTO rules, most COMESA 
members impose import quotas aimed at directly limiting 
the quantity of goods that can be imported. The need to 
protect the local industry seems to be the major force 
behind the use of quantitative restrictions (The Zimbabwe 
Standard Newspaper, 2011). For instance, the Zambian 
Minister of Agriculture justified the frequent restrictions 
on exports of maize and maize products as a strategy that 
is essential until Zambia is able to consistently produce 
exportable surplus (Imani Development International 
Trade, 2007)
Zimbabwe has through Statutory Instrument (SI) 156 
of 2011 introduced a surtax of 25 percent on a number of 
commodities at the beginning of 2012 aimed at protecting 
local industry against what the Government referred to 
as extensive imports (Viljoen, 2011). In 2016, Zimbabwe 
also introduced Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016 which 
removed goods that are locally available from general 
import license exemption. The introduction of SI 64/2016 
was meant to support local industry (The Herald, 2016). 
It therefore follows that instead of COMESA members 
enacting legislations that facilitate free flow of goods as 
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mandated by the WTO and COMESA Treaty, they are 
doing the opposite by implementing laws that in actual 
fact impede trade in violation of rules that seek to prohibit 
the imposition of quantitative restrictions.
1.2.2  Rules of Origin (RoO) 
The Imani Development Report (2007) defines rules 
of origin as the criteria used to define where a product 
was made. Rules of Origin are an essential part of trade 
rules because a number of policies discriminate between 
exporting countries, quotas, preferential tariffs, anti-
dumping actions, and countervailing duty. The Imani 
Report (2007) also states that, rules of origin are also 
used to compile statistics. The first agreement on the 
subject required WTO members to ensure that their rules 
of origin are transparent, that they do not have restricting, 
distorting or disruptive effects on international trade, 
are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner, and are based on a positive standard 
(Imani Development Report, 2007).
Goods qualify for preferential treatment if they 
undergo substantial transformation such that they contain 
a minimum of 35 percent regional value-added, or include 
non-COMESA imported materials worth no more than 
60 percent of the value of total inputs used, or undergo a 
single change of tariff heading. There is a list of ‘goods 
of economic importance’ to member States according to 
which the domestic value added requirement is relaxed to 
25 percent (Khandelwal, 2004)
Member Sates often use rules of origin as NTBs. This 
is contrary to the theoretical understanding that the rules 
of origin would promote regional development through 
import substitution achieved by forcing the producers to 
source inputs in the region (Madzvova, 2002). For years, 
COMESA members have been accused of using rules of 
origin for other purposes that are not in the interest of 
promoting regional trade and industrial competitiveness. 
These purposes include protection against anti-dumping, 
enforcement of consumer safety standards and protection 
of the environment (Madzvova, 2002).
The COMESA rules of origin have also caused 
problems. While COMESA has a 35% value-added rule, 
not all countries have adopted this. Egypt unilaterally 
imposes a 45 percent local content requirement. Until 
recently, Zambia, Uganda and Malawi did the same. 
Rules in two sectors have also proven to be particularly 
contentious under COMESA. For wheat flour, the 35% 
value added rule has generated difficulties for exporters in 
Egypt and Mauritius that do not produce wheat grain, but 
import the raw material from the world market. During 
periods of high wheat prices, these countries have been 
unable to meet the value added requirement. There have 
also been disputes with regards to palm oil because of 
difficulties in assigning value addition. These have arisen 
because a number of products can be produced from the 
raw material such as cooking oil, soap and margarine 
(Gillson and Charalambides, 2011)
The other major concern is that restrictive rules 
of origin are not only a barrier to international 
competitiveness but also costly in terms of ensuring 
conformity. These costs arise from the administrative 
requirements for certificates of origin which can account 
for nearly half the value of the duty preference. Instead 
it simply pays full tariffs because it currently deems the 
process of administering rules of origin documentation 
to be too costly (Gillison, 2012). The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that most of COMESA Member 
States have membership to a multiple and varied 
trade agreements, especially when such rules are not 
harmonised as with the case of many COMESA Member 
States. This creates confusion in deciding on the rules 
of origin to apply. Authentication of Rules of Origin 
Certificates is sometimes negatively affected by the 
bureaucratic procedures involved in changing signatories.
1.2.3  Poor Infrastructure
Cross-border infrastructure, for example, transport, energy 
and telecommunications are essential to move goods, 
services, labour and information between and among 
States. Such linkages enlarge market access, reduce 
economic distance and liberalise trade, investment and 
movement of workforce (Arncharaz, 2011). However, 
COMESA’s poor transport  and communications 
infrastructure and unreliable power increase trade costs 
and undermine competitiveness and the region’s ability to 
integrate. Poor communication infrastructure and the state 
of the road network in the region are affecting efficient 
movement of goods, forcing importers and exporters to 
use alternative routes which are expensive. In addition, 
police roadblocks in COMESA FTA causes serious time 
delays for products being transported by road which can 
have significant impact on the quality of agricultural 
products available in the region. In Zimbabwe police 
checkpoints stop all commercial vehicles at various 
points on all major highways causing time delays and 
encouraging bribery and corruption (Viljoen,2011). 
At times police road blocks are found at every five or 
ten kilometers on the main high way from Beitbridge 
border post to Harare. The delays are further caused by 
a poor road network which links Zimbabwe and South 
Africa specifically on the Zimbabwean side. The road 
is too narrow and full of pot holes hence it cannot cope 
with a large volume of traffic. It therefore follows that 
poor transport infrastructure within COMESA is a big 
challenge and it constitutes an NTB. The delay caused by 
poor road networks and police road blocks means more 
costs are incurred by transporters of goods and this has a 
negative impact on business operations.
1.2.4  Customs Procedures and Administrative 
Requirements 
Toll fees and road charges on the highways connecting 
Zambia from sea ports constitute an important NTB to 
trade.  With respect to trade between Zimbabwe and 
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Zambia evidence showed that another administrative 
NTB exist in the form of lengthy border delays. The 
Chirundu border post closes at 2200 hours. The closing 
of the border post at 2200 hours lead to the prolonged 
stay of companies at the border post as they will have 
to wait for opening of the border the following day. 
Prolonged formalities, lengthy procedures, duplication of 
clearance procedures and limited capacity all contribute 
to high costs of doing business within COMESA. These 
administrative complexity procedures are problematic 
for transparency and efficiency in the clearance of goods 
(Viljoen, 2011). Under these circumstances corruption by 
customs officials which is classified as another form of an 
NTB is inevitable. It also remains a significant problem 
in Zimbabwe, with the country ranked 154th out of 176 
countries by Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index in 2016 (Viljoen, 2011). For example 
Beitbridge border post on the Zimbabwean side, Customs 
Officials demand bribes from cross border traders. It is 
extremely hard for transport operators to pass through 
the border quickly without paying bribes to the Customs 
Officials in order to speed the process of clearing goods. 
The cost of corruption in most cases is transferred to the 
final price of a product.
In addition to poor administrative services at the 
border post, there are other challenges and difficulties to 
be negotiated by traders and transporters. Zimbabwean 
companies importing goods from South Africa and 
elsewhere are facing time consuming and costly 
administrative NTBs relating to improper/incorrect 
classification of imports. Some Zimbabwean companies 
reported about 19 approvals which can take up to three 
months to acquire are required for some imports (World 
Bank, 2010). Zimbabwean authorities are also accused 
of classifying some imports as a service and subjecting 
them to 20% withholding tax instead of treating them as 
goods that generally attract a lower tax. In this case the 
government replaced a tariff with an NTB in order to 
preserve its revenue flow. Such practices are a violation 
of WTO rules on transparent laws and regulations. It has 
been also noted that northbound trucks travelling from 
South Africa to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) are increasingly avoiding Beitbridge border 
post despite recent reforms and an overall shorter journey 
distance, opting to pass through Botswana instead. The 
main reason motivating this decision is that transporters 
reckoned the time and distance disadvantages were 
outweighed by the cost of sending their goods through 
Zimbabwe (Mthembu, 2007). In acknowledgement of the 
poor administration at the border post the Government 
of Zimbabwe warned that poor administration at 
Beitbridge border post risks driving off commercial 
traffic to Kazungula as international transporters are 
getting frustrated by the delays at the border due to poor 
administration (The Zimbabwe Standard Newspaper, 
2011). This is a clear indication that there is a lot of work 
that need to be done to improve the flow of goods in the 
region through addressing NTBs. 
Trade facilitation issues such as inefficient customs 
administration, border delays, high transport costs, poor 
physical infrastructure and a lack of knowledge among 
customs officers, insufficient dissemination of relevant 
information and corruption are also significant barriers 
to Zambian importers. According to the World Bank 
Report (2010), Zambia ranks 153rd out of 183 countries 
or territories in terms of ease of trading across borders. 
This poor performance relates largely to the high number 
of documents required and long processing times. Zambia 
is also ranked 87th out of 176 countries on Transparency 
International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index, 
reaffirming a belief within the country that corruption 
is a major problem for Zambia’s business environment 
(TRALAC, 2010).
1.2.5  Technical Regulations and Standards 
Technical regulations and industrial standards are 
important, but they vary from country to country. The 
WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade tries to 
ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification 
procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles. Countries 
often have an interest in making sure that imported 
products meet certain technical standards. In order to 
ensure that such standards are met, countries adopt 
technical regulations. In order to prevent unnecessary 
technical barriers to trade, WTO agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade encourage all WTO parties as well 
as COMESA members to use international standards 
whenever technical regulations are considered necessary 
(Chilala, 2009). Technical regulations standard regimes in 
COMESA are classified as being over-reliant on mandatory 
inspection and certifications. It is reported that in most 
Southern African countries there are no procedures by 
which technical regulations are assessed in terms of their 
consistency with public policy objectives, whether countries 
and the private sector have the capacity to implement them 
or their impact to trade and competitiveness. In particular 
the lack of Office of Regulatory Reform in all Southern 
African countries to review the justification for both new 
and existing technical regulations is raised as a big concern. 
Such absence of regulatory impact assessment causes 
problems and raises costs. 
According to the Imani Development Report 
(2007), another problem due to technical procedures 
is the requirement for Iodisation of salt backed by Salt 
Iodization Act. Requirements to have salt tested for iodine 
verification at the entry border and consequent testing for 
iodine levels in salt delays the distribution of the product 
since the product cannot be distributed until testing is 
done (Imani Development Report, 2007). The survey by 
Imani Development revealed that companies are faced 
with delays in receiving certificates of approval, which 
delays the distribution of the product and at times wastage 
of a perishable item.
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1.2.6  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
The WTO agreement on Sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures authorises COMESA members to regulate 
the importation of food products in order to protect 
consumers, plants and animals from contaminants, 
toxins, pests and diseases. These regulations are called 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Sanitary 
refers to regulations on human and animal products, while 
phytosanitary refers to regulations on plant products. Thus, 
SPS measures concern the safe handling and production of 
food for animals and humans and plant products (Chilala, 
2009). In order to make trade easier and minimise the 
burden of regulation, while at the same time protecting the 
health and welfare of citizens, the COMESA treaty requires 
members to adopt SPS measures that are in harmony with 
international standards. The Treaty forbids the creation 
of SPS measures for the purpose of reducing trade and 
competition. Therefore SPS measures should have a 
scientific basis and only be adopted for health and safety 
reasons (Chilala, 2009). However, in practice the demands 
of the treaty are neglected as various members require 
cumbersome pre-shipment inspections and stringent SPS 
certification requirements for the importation of different 
agricultural products.
There are also complaints that SPS regulations relating 
to the importation of agricultural goods into Zambia lack 
transparency and there is an overall lack of available 
information regarding phytosanitary requirements. There 
is also little information regarding quarantine pests and 
regulated pests for importers and potential importers. In 
the national health and agricultural plans there are no 
specific policies pertaining to food safety and food safety 
standards. The Food and Drug Act of 2001 plus additional 
and regulations provide a foundation for food safety 
standards to be implemented, but current food laws are 
not adequately enforced (TRALAC, 2010).  The Zambian 
Plant Pest and Disease Act, Chapter 233 and other 
regulations govern SPS requirements and import permits 
for the importation of various agricultural products into 
Zambia. In general, the importation of fruit and vegetables 
is restricted due to the requirement of an import permit 
from the Plant Quarantine and Phytosanitary Service, 
phytosanitary certificates from the Zambian Department 
of Agriculture and the exporting country, as well as the 
inspection of goods prior to entry (TRALAC, 2010). 
Zimbabwe is the only country in COMESA that has a 
clear legislation on production and sale of Genetically 
Modified Foods.
1.2.7  State Trading Enterprises 
There are numerous ways in which governments can 
engage in practices which restrict imports or exports. 
Instruments which can be used include state trading 
enterprises, state sanctioned monopolies, procurement 
policies which discriminate against foreign goods and 
services, and industrial policies which subsidise domestic 
firms. Governments can also use macroeconomic, 
competition, fiscal, immigration or investment policy 
tools to distort trade in desired ways. The Zimbabwean 
government  in t roduced the  Indigenisa t ion  and 
Economic Empowerment Act in 2008 policy which gave 
Zimbabweans the right to take over and control 51 percent 
shareholding in foreign owned companies in Zimbabwe 
(Borsch, Marcus, Jones and Mathew, 2008) The Ease of 
doing business in Zimbabwe deteriorated to 155 in 2015 
from 153 in 2014. Foreign investments levels in some 
sectors of the economy are capped by government. State 
owned enterprises distort the economy.
Government procurement provisions generally restrict 
the purchasing of certain products by government agencies 
in some ways towards domestic products rather than 
foreign products. This type of preference implies protection 
for local manufacturers and thus creates an obstacle to 
foreign producers (Soontiens, 2003). Participation of 
national governments, parastatals and monopolies in the 
trading system are prevalent in COMESA. This extends to 
the government operation of borders and ports. In Zambia 
for instance, the exportation of maize is done through one 
channel marketing. This is done not only by procuring 
maize from domestic farmers, but also through running a 
state trading enterprise which it occasionally support with 
import and export quotas. In the case of Zimbabwe the 
importation of maize is done via state trading government 
monopolies As a result only the Grain Marketing Board 
of Zimbabwe is authorised to import or export maize. The 
Grain Marketing Board has legal authority to engage in, or 
provide license trading in grains.
1.2.8  Dumping and Safeguards Measures 
One of the most utilised forms of NTB in recent decades 
by the industrialised countries and increasingly being 
used by developing countries such as South Africa is 
the imposition of anti-dumping or counter-veiling duties 
on imports. In as much as not all COMESA countries 
are neither the targets nor the initiators of anti-dumping 
measures, they still represent a veiled threat to their 
exports. Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are 
permitted to be taken by the WTO Agreements and the 
Treaty in specified situations to protect the domestic 
industry from serious injury arising from dumped 
or subsidised imports. The way these measures are 
used entails heavy costs for the foreign firms targeted 
by this policy and certainly for consumers in the 
country applying anti-dumping legislation. If used as 
protectionist measures, they may act as some of the most 
effective NTBs. In Southern and Eastern African regions 
for example, several least developing countries have 
complained about firms from more advanced developing 
countries for allegedly dumping goods on their market 
to the detriment of local industries, while keeping their 
own markets off-limits through a labyrinth of tariff and 
NTBs measures (Mold, 2005).
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In accordance with other  internat ional  t rade 
agreements, and especially the provisions of the WTO, 
the Protocol provides for suspension of trade liberalising 
measures in order to protect domestic producers from 
harmful effects of dumping by other COMESA exporters 
to provide safeguards against damaging surges of 
imports into the domestic market. While such measures 
are provided for under the WTO, there is increasing 
recognition that they can be and often are used as a form 
of disguised protection, and that standard techniques for 
determining the need for anti-dumping and safeguard 
measures are heavily biased in favour of narrow producer 
interests and against the broader national interests of users 
and consumers of importable goods. This argument is 
supported by the fact that usually not every investigation 
results in the finding of dumping or injury to the domestic 
industry causing severe damage on the exports of the 
country under investigation (Flatters, 2013).
Anti-dumping is often regarded as a form of 
protectionism and its impact on trade is acknowledged. It 
is viewed as a form of inherent protectionism and therefore 
should be thought of in the same ways of any forms of 
protection aimed at assisting domestic industries against 
competition from imports (N’goma, 2010). There is also 
a growing recognition that true dumping, in the economic 
sense, is just one type of anti-competitive behaviour that 
should be dealt with as part of broader domestic policies 
to ensure competition and smooth and efficient working of 
domestic markets. In the context of COMESA, the claim 
of ‘dumping’ is often used by producers seeking continued 
protection of non-competitive domestic industries. Some 
COMESA members have been among the heaviest users 
of WTO anti-dumping provisions in recent years. This has 
been a great hindrance to the achievement of many of the 
promised economic benefits of international economic 
integration.
Non-tariff barriers are increasingly acting as 
blockages to international trade, and economic growth 
and development. They are capable of restricting trade, 
are unpredictable, persistent, and influence trade patterns 
across countries. A review of literature on intra-COMESA 
trade is suggestive of the fact that as tariffs have been 
lowered, demands for protectionism have induced a new 
form of protectionism in the form of NTBs (Gillison, 
2010) Therefore, there is a need to eliminate these NTBs 
because removal of tariffs alone is not enough to open up 
markets. Their prevalence may also be a drawback on the 
Free Trade Area. 
2 .   R E S E A R C H  D E S I G N  A N D 
METHODOLOGY
This study adopted the qualitative research methodology 
while a case study design of Zimbabwe was utilised. 
Data was gathered using key informant interviews and 
documentary analysis. Key respondents for the study 
were purposively selected from the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce, academics and trade attaches from the 
Zambian government.
3.  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
This section constitute the key findings of the study. The 
findings are based on both primary and secondary data.
3.1  Rationale behind NTBs on COMESA FTA
A question was posed to find-out the rationale for the 
continuous use of NTBs within the COMESA region. The 
rationale for the continuation of NTBs within COMESA 
FTA was justified by respondents mainly on four grounds. 
These are safeguarding health, safety, and security of 
human beings, animals and plants, and environmental 
pollution. A trade expert from the Zambian Embassy 
indicated that:
“The Zambian government banned the importation of poultry 
and other products from South Africa and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). This came after an outbreak of a 
highly pathogenic avian influenza scientifically known as H5N8. 
The move was however, aimed at safeguarding the Zambian 
poultry industry.”
An International Economic Relations scholar also 
supported the use of NTBs. He mentioned that:
“It’s an issue of national interest as realism would dictate; 
states are selfish with these issues and tend to prioritise their 
immediate needs and domestic pressures at the expense of 
regional imperatives. Above that the existing inequalities leave 
weak economies at the mercy of advanced ones hence they take 
solace in crafting protectionist policies like NTBs to cushion 
themselves.”
This concurs with the East African Community 
Elimination Report (2015), which says that NTBs 
are often justified on four main reasons which are to 
safeguard health, security and safety of animals, plants, 
human beings, and against environmental pollution to 
safeguard the interest of the nation, to protect infant 
industries and consumers and also serves as a safeguard 
against revenue loss. Under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (1994) provisions, member States are 
justified to take measures to protect domestic industries 
from serious injury caused by increased imports of certain 
goods. 
The findings also concur with the CZI report of 2016 
which stipulates that since the quantitative restrictions 
came into effect the manufacturing industry’s utilisation 
rose from 34, 5% in 2015 to 47, 4% in 2016 partly due 
to the gazetting of the instruments boosted local industry 
production as well as local demand.
3.2  Effects of NTBs on COMESA FTA
Respondents indicated that NTBs have potential effects on 
free trade within the COMESA region. An International 
Economic Relations academic said that: 
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“NTBs in COMESA, like in any other region, result in delays 
and increased transportation costs which ultimately hinder the 
free movement of goods and services. Removal of NTBs is 
much more effective in boosting intra-regional trade. NTBs 
frustrate competitiveness of exports in the context of FTAs 
under COMESA.” 
The Secretary to the President of the Zimbabwe 
Cross Borders Association gave an example of the 
Zimbabwean S.I  64/2016 which he said caused 
animosity and strained relations between Zimbabwe and 
its neighbouring countries particularly Zambia and South 
Africa.
This concurs with earlier studies finding that NTBs 
negatively impact trade flows within COMESA. For 
example the 2008 NTB Impact Study, which was done 
by Imani Consultants established that NTBs act as an 
additional tax in that they add more than 5 percent to the 
landed cost of a product and more than 20 percent to the 
total landed cost, which are ultimately passed on to the 
consumer thereby making commodities expensive. In 
effect the cost of doing business, and the trade facilitation 
initiatives are negatively affected.
Tariffs and NTBs can have equivalent effects when 
markets are competitive and therefore the removal or 
reduction of NTBs can have similar effects to that of 
tariff reduction. Tariffs increase the costs for foreign 
suppliers while quotas and other types of NTBs serve 
to restrict the quantity of foreign-supplied goods in 
domestic markets. The two may cause prices to increase 
in the domestic market. This in turn results in a decrease 
in economic welfare because of the distortion or wedge 
created between domestic and world market prices. 
It therefore follows that the removal or reduction of 
NTBs increase imports and therefore impact on welfare 
through effects on local producers, domestic consumers 
and government revenues. The increased imports may 
displace domestic producers by foreign suppliers, 
depending on the assumed elasticity of substitution 
between imported and domestically produced goods. 
Consumers and producers using imported inputs may 
benefit from cheaper product prices and governments 
may lose revenues for the product liberalised. 
3.3  The role of non-state actors in the COMESA 
FTA
All Non-State actors who participated in the study argued 
that they had a bigger role to play on issues to do with 
trade particularly within the COMESA region. They 
indicated that their major role was to lobby Governments 
to remove NTBs on trade and other matters that affect 
trade. The Secretary to the President of the Zimbabwe 
Cross Borders Association said that:
“The ban on imports was not the greatest idea as the country is 
sixty percent (60%) made up of informal sector. The Government 
needs to work with everybody. There are no industries in 
Zimbabwe. People survive on buying and selling. Statutory 
Instrument (SI) 64/2016 has taken away people’s livelihoods. 
There is need for the involvement of non-state actors in policy 
formulation and particularly in the areas of trade”.
An official from the Confederation of Zimbabwe 
Industries said that they welcomed the imposition of some 
NTBs on trade. He mentioned that: 
“We support the implementation of S.I 64/2016 as a strategy that 
is aimed at ensuring that Zimbabwe reclaimed its lost economic 
glory.”
The CZI report of 2016 stated that S.I 64/2016 came 
at an opportune time as it was not good for Zimbabwean 
industries to continue under a situation in which local 
products were being crowded out of the domestic market 
by imports that do not face equally high production costs 
prompting the Government to intervene through this 
import control.
3.4  The role of the State on COMESA FTA
A trade expert from the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce responded argued that the State had the 
responsibility to introduce NTBs to protect its industries. 
He mentioned that: 
“The role of the State is to facilitate free trade between and 
among COMESA members and this can only be possible if 
members liberalise import licensing, remove foreign exchange 
restrictions, taxes on foreign exchange, import and export 
quotas, road blocks, ease Customs formalities, extend times of 
operation at border posts, create one-stop border-posts, among 
others. The Government banned all grain imports because the 
country had reserved enough maize and it also wanted to protect 
local industries”. 
The above statement concurs with the report in The 
Herald Newspaper dated 23 September 2017, which noted 
that the Zimbabwean Government through the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce introduced pre-shipment 
assessments of all imports under the Consignment Based 
Conformity Assessment (CBCA). This conformity and 
valuation programme intends to reduce hazardous and 
substantial imported products, provide compliance 
certificates to regulate products exported to Zimbabwean 
source prior to shipment, improve customs duty 
collection, ensure Zimbabwe consumers and industry 
protection, enable fair competition, avoiding unnecessary 
retesting by recognition of tests results/ meeting minimum 
reliability criteria. The CBCA ensures that the products 
imported into Zimbabwe are regulated to meet minimum 
safety, health and quality standards. 
The Imani inventory of 2007 indicated that the 
biggest barriers facing regional trade was mainly on 
agricultural commodities. The main reasons given 
to justify these barriers are food security, protecting 
local producers, health and safety, and single-channel 
marketing. The commodities that are most regularly 
affected by these restrictions include sugar, maize, meat 
products (including poultry), dairy products, tea, timber 
products, and seasonal vegetables.
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3.5  Effectiveness of legal frameworks that 
regulate COMESA NTBS
Asked on the effectiveness of legal frameworks that 
regulate COMESA NTBs, one respondent argued that 
the legal instruments which are in place are too weak to 
control countries imposing NTBs by failing to provide 
a definition of an infant industry for the purposes of 
derogation.  The respondent further indicated that Article 
49 of the COMESA Treaty provides that member states 
should remove and abstain from implementing NTBs to 
trade for the purposes of trade facilitation. The COMESA 
Treaty however, allows member States to implement 
NTBs on certain exceptions such as the protection of local 
industries. It is this exception or derogation that member 
States have been abusing. The respondent argued that:
“The provisions dealing with the granting of derogations to 
Member States for the purpose of protecting infant industries are 
prone to abuse. A clear and concise definition of infant industry 
must be included in the legal frameworks. ”
A trade expert from the Zambian Embassy mentioned 
that:
“Legal instruments in the form of the COMESA Treaty and 
COMESA Regulations on NTBs exist but their implementation 
become problematic due to the fact that some countries 
belong to more than one regional grouping, e.g. SADC, East 
African Community (EAC) and COMESA. However, these 
three regional organisations have embarked on a process of 
harmonising their strategies and also collaborating on the 
elimination of NTBs.” 
This concurs with the report by Salter (2007) on 
COMESA which says that several challenges in NTBs 
have proved hard to solve and new ones have emerged. 
Several reported NTBs vary remarkably in terms of their 
type and breadth of application, suggesting that some 
NTBs will require much lengthier and complex multi-
institutional processes to remove than others. Some 
measures have been addressed several times implying 
that some NTBs resurface from time to time. Salter 
(2007) argues that the monitoring mechanism appears 
to address only those NTBs that affect companies from 
different countries within the region which are in direct 
competition with each other. There are a whole range of 
NTBs within the region which are not being addressed by 
COMESA including infrastructural constraints and other 
ad-hoc import bans which need to be disciplined. Despite 
these concerns, the monitoring of NTBs and responding 
to private sector concerns about them constitutes a step 
towards reducing them.
The SADC Report (2013) indicated that all SADC 
member States complained against NTBs affecting 
regional trade. The report states that, the greatest number 
of complaints were 143 and these fall under ‘Customs 
and administrative entry procedures’, mainly relating to 
‘Lengthy and costly customs clearance procedures’. The 
highest number of outstanding, active complaints was 33 
and these fell under ‘Transport, clearing and forwarding’, 
while those related to ‘costly road user charges and fees’ 
stood at 15.
CONCLUSIONS 
The study concludes that the COMESA Treaty that seeks 
to regulate NTBs was too weak as provisions dealing 
with the granting of derogations to Member States for the 
purpose of protecting infant industries are prone to abuse. 
This is due to the lack of definition of what constitute an 
infant industry for the purpose of applying for derogation. 
On the potential effects of NTBs on COMESA FTA, it 
was established that NTBs frustrate competitiveness, 
pose serious threats to mutual trade, and tend to result in 
imbalances in terms of economic benefits thereby causing 
conflicts in terms of relations between States thereby 
impeding trade in a significant way. The 2008 NTB Impact 
Study by Imani Consultants indicated that NTBs act as 
an additional tax, in that they add more than 5 percent to 
the landed cost of a product and more than 20 percent to 
the total landed cost which are ultimately passed on to 
the consumer thereby making commodities expensive. 
It is clear that NTBs have a serious effect on the cost 
of doing business, and the trade facilitation initiatives 
are negatively affected. The study also established that 
the rationale behind the continuous use of NTBs by 
COMESA members is an issue of national interest as 
realism would dictate; states are selfish with these issues 
and tend to prioritise their immediate needs and domestic 
pressures at the expense of regional imperatives. The 
existing inequalities leave weak economies at the mercy 
of advanced one’s hence they take solace in crafting 
protectionist policies like NTBs to cushion themselves. 
The East African Community Elimination Report (2015) 
argued that NTBs are often justified on four main reasons 
which are to safeguard health, security and safety of 
animals, plants, human beings, and against environmental 
pollution to safeguard the interest of the nation, to protect 
infant industries and consumers and also serves as a 
safeguard against revenue loss.
REFERENCES
Charalambides, N. (2013). What Shoprite and Woolworths can 
tell us about Non-tariff barriers. African Perspective, Global 
Insights. SAIIA Occasional paper No 148, University of the 
Witwatersrand, South Africa.
COMESA Protocol on the Rules of Origin. (2015). COMESA 
http://www.comesa.int.
COMESA Treaty (1993). COMESA  http://www.comesa.int 
COMESA. (2014). COMESA Regulations on Non-Tariff 
Barriers (Adopted under paragraph 217 of the Report of the 
Thirty-Third Meeting of the Council of Ministers), 08 – 09 
December 2014. Lusaka, Zambia. 
43 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Mukwena Sibangilizwe; Kurebwa Jeffrey (2019). 
Canadian Social Science, 15(2), 34-43
Crane, T., & Amawi, A. (1997). The Theoretical evolution 
of international political economy: A reader. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Deardorff, V. (1987). Why do Governments prefer Nontariff 
barriers?  Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, 26 pp 191-216, North-Holland.
Giermanski, J. (1994). Standards as Non-Tariff Barriers: Nafta's 
Impact. www.texascenter.tamiu.edu
Gillson, I., & Charalambides, N. (2011). Addressing non-tariff 
barriers on regional trade in southern Africa. Gaborone, 
Sustainable Commerce Consulting.
Gillson, l. (2010). Regional integration to eliminate the 
fragmented goods market in Southern Africa, Africa Trade 
Policy Notes.  
Gurler, O. (2002). WTO agreements on non-tariff barriers to 
trade & implications for OIC MEMBER States. Journal of 
Economic Cooperation, 23, 62-63.  
Hangi, M. (2010). The non-tariff barriers in trading within the 
EAC. Research Paper, CUTS Geneva Resource Centre. 
Imani Development. (2007). Inventory of Regional Non-Tariff 
Barriers: Synthesis Report.www.imanidevelopment.com 
Karingi, S. (2015). Implications of the COMESA free trade area 
and the proposed customs union: An empirical investigation.
www.researchgate.net
Karugia, J. (2009). The impact of non-tariff barriers on maize and 
beef trade in East Africa, RESAKSS Working Paper No. 29.
Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (2001). Power and interdependence (3rd 
ed). Princeton. Longman 
Khandelwal, P. (2004). COMESA and SADC: Prospects and 
challenges for regional trade integration. IMF WP/04/227.
Mold, A. (2005). Non-tariff barriers: Their prevalence and 
relevance for African countries. ATPC Work in Progress 
No.25. African Trade Policy Centre, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa. www.uneca.org
The Zimbabwe Herald Newspaper. (2016). New import 
regulations gazetted. www.herald.co.zw
The Zimbabwe Standard Newspaper. (2011). Minister Slams 
border post delays. http://www.thestandard.co.zw
UNCTAD. (2013). Non-tariff measures to trade: Economic 
and policy issues for developing countries. New York and 
Geneva.
Van Den Bossche, P. (2006). The law and policy of the world 
trade organization: Text, cases and materials, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Viljoen, W. (2011). Non-tariff barriers affecting trade in 
COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite free trade agreement. 
www.tralac.org 
World Bank. (2010). Doing business 2010: Reforming through 
difficult times. www.doingbusiness.org
